This paper compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a downstream differentiated duopoly in which the input price (wage) paid by each downstream firm is the outcome of a strategic bargain with its upstream supplier (labour union). We show that the standard result that Cournot equilibrium profits exceed those under Bertrand competition -when the differentiated duopoly game is played in imperfect substitutes -is reversible. Whether equilibrium profits are higher under Cournot or Bertrand competition is shown to depend upon the nature of the upstream agents' preferences, on the distribution of bargaining power over the input price and on the degree of product market differentiation. We find that the standard result holds unless unions are both powerful and place considerable weight on the wage argument in their utility function. One implication of this is that if the upstream agents are profit-maximising firms, then the standard result will obtain.
Introduction
A classic result in oligopoly theory is that firms will set quantities rather than prices when goods are imperfect substitutes and vice versa when they are imperfect complements.
This result was first formalized by Singh and Vives (1984) and has been further refined by Vives (1985) , who establishes more general results on the ranking of Cournot and Bertrand outcomes, by Okuguchi (1987) and, in a geometric analysis, by Cheng (1985) .
The result is a cornerstone of oligopoly theory.
Recently, the early results have attracted renewed interest. Dastidar (1997) shows that in a homogeneous product market the results are sensitive to the sharing rule and are not necessarily valid under asymmetric costs. In the standard model, costs are both symmetric and exogenous. Qiu (1997) develops a model of differentiated duopoly in which there is a two-stage game. In stage 1, each firm chooses a level of cost-reducing research and development (R&D) prior to the standard product market game played in a second stage. Qiu (1997) shows that the relative efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand competition depends upon R&D productivity, the extent of spillovers, and the degree of product market differentiation. Lambertini (1997) extends the standard analysis to the context of a repeated market game in which the firm's choice of the strategic variable is itself the outcome of a strategic (meta) game. This game is also shown to be characterized by the prisoners' dilemma. These results do not undermine the key results established by Singh and Vives (1984) . Häckner (2000) has shown that the result concerning the dominance of Cournot over Bertrand profits is sensitive to the duopoly assumption. Häckner (2000) considers an nfirm setting with vertical product differentiation. Our paper, like that of Häckner (2000) , can be thought of as testing the robustness of the standard results with respect to alternative market structures. While Häckner (2000) extends the standard model horizontally through increasing the number of firms within the product market, our paper extends the analysis vertically by examining the consequences of introducing upstream suppliers to the downstream duopolists.
In particular, we address the issue of whether the standard results on the ranking of Cournot and Bertrand equilibrium outcomes under differentiated duopoly are robust to the inclusion of a decentralized wage-bargaining game played between each firm and a firm-specific labour union. There is symmetry across the two union-firm wage bargains.
Hence, in equilibrium, we retain the property of symmetric costs, typically assumed in the standard model. As in Qiu (1997) -though for very different reasons -these costs, however, are no longer exogenous in our model. Instead, in the model we develop here, they are the outcome of a strategic game played between each firm and its labour union.
This can be interpreted as a particular example of a more general situation of bargaining between an upstream supplier and a downstream retailer in the context of oligopoly in the retail market. The structure of our model is similar to that of Qiu (1997) , with wage bargaining rather than R&D choice in the first stage of the game. In stage 2, we consider both Cournot and Bertrand solutions to the non-cooperative product market game.
Our analysis of the Cournot solution is closely related to the model of Horn and Wolinsky (1988) , which analyses the incentives to merge among upstream and downstream firms, and how these incentives depend on the degree of product differentiation. The model of Horn and Wolinsky (1988) builds on the concept of strategic substitutes and complements developed by Bulow et al. (1985) . The analysis of wage determination in unionized oligopolies was first developed by Davidson (1988) , who focused on a comparison of local and national bargaining and, like Horn and Wolinsky (1988) , adopted the standard Cournot-Nash assumption to describe product market competition. A somewhat more generalized approach to wage setting in the context of imperfect competition in both labour and product markets is described by Dowrick (1988) . Similarly, Naylor (1998) and considers unionized duopoly in the context of international trade and economic integration, and again assumes Cournot behavior in the product market. Grandner (2001) examines the importance of the level of bargaining for consumer prices in vertically connected industries under oligopoly.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic model in which two firms compete in the product market having first bargained independently over wages with a local (firm-specific) labour union. The two firms produce differentiated products. The product market is assumed to be characterized by Cournot competition. We derive sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium values for the key variables of interest. Section 3 presents the corresponding equilibrium values for the case of Bertrand competition in the product market. In Section 4, we compare Cournot and Bertrand equilibrium profits. We show that the standard result that profits are higher under Cournot than under Bertrand competition -in the case of imperfect substitutes -is reversed under certain assumptions regarding the extent of product differentiation, union preferences and bargaining power. In Section 5, we explore the underlying reasons for the reversibility of the standard result. Section 6 closes the paper with conclusions and further remarks.
Cournot equilibrium under unionized duopoly
The model of the differentiated product market duopoly follows Singh and Vives (1984) and Qiu (1997) . We analyze a non-cooperative two-stage game in which two firms produce differentiated goods. In the first stage (the labour market game), each firm independently bargains over its wage with a local labour union. That is, bargaining is decentralized. The outcome of the labour market game is described by the solution to the two union-firm pairs' sub-game perfect best-reply functions in wages. In the second stage (the product market game), each firm sets its output -given pre-determined wage choices from stage 1 -to maximize profits. In Section 3 of the paper, we consider pricecompetition in the product market.
Preferences of the representative consumer are given by: denotes the extent of product differentiation with goods assumed to be imperfect substitutes. The derived product market demands are linear and given by:
In the standard model, the two firms face the same constant marginal cost, w . Qiu (1997) considers the case in which the firm can influence its marginal cost through R&D expenditure. In the current paper, we assume that the constant marginal cost is the result of a decentralized stage 1 bargain with a local union. We assume that the two firms have the same technology and that the two firm-specific labour unions have the same preferences and the same bargaining power over wages. In symmetric equilibrium, therefore, the two firms will have identical marginal costs: although these will be the outcome of strategic play across the two union-firm pairs.
Profits of firm i can be written as:
where i w denotes the wage paid by firm i and is assumed to capture all short-run marginal costs. Under the assumption of a constant marginal product of labour, normalized to unity, i q represents both output and employment of firm i.
Substituting (1) in (3) and differentiating with respect to i q yields the first-order condition for profit maximization by firm i, from which it is straightforward to derive firm i's best-reply function in output space as:
Similarly, firm j's best-reply function is given by:
As 0 > c , by assumption, the best-reply functions are downward-sloping: under the Cournot assumption, the product market game is played in strategic substitutes, as is well known.
Eqs. (4) and (5) 
where (6) and (7) represent labour demands by firm i and j, respectively, for given i w and j w . These are the derived labour demand functions which will be anticipated by unionfirm wage-bargaining pairs in the stage 1 labour market game.
Substituting (1), (6) and (7) in (3) gives firm i's Cournot-Nash equilibrium profits,
We now consider two alternative cases. In Regime 1, wages are exogenously determined and set at the reservation wage level, w . In Regime 2, wages are set endogenously through decentralized bargaining in the non-cooperative Stage 1 labour market game. . Then symmetric equilibrium Cournot-Nash profits are given by:
Regime 2: endogenous wages
Assume that, in Stage 1, firm i bargains over the wage, i w , with a local labour union, union i, which has preferences over wages and employment captured by the union utility
where θ denotes the relative strength of the union's preference for wages over employment and 1 0 < ≤ θ . We rule out the special case of wage-maximization, Substituting (6), (8) and (10) into (11) yields:
where disagreement payoffs are assumed to be zero. Substituting (12) in (11) and solving, gives a first-order condition which is satisfied when:
which defines the sub-game perfect best-reply function in wages,
i under the assumption of a non-cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the product market. Differentiating (13) with respect to j w gives the slope of union-firm pair i's bestreply function in wage-space as:
1 By ruling out 1 = θ , we avoid the problem of the 'Cheshire cat' monopoly union which sets such a high wage that employment collapses to zero.
The slope of the best-reply wage function is positive for
confirming that the labour market game is played in strategic complements. We also have that the slope is increasing both in θ , the relative weight the union attaches to wages in its objective function, and in β , the relative bargaining power of the union in the wage bargain.
In symmetric sub-game perfect equilibrium, 
from which it is readily checked that (16) collapses to (9), replicating the non-union benchmark outcome, for the special case in which 0 = β .
Bertrand equilibrium under unionized duopoly
In this section of the paper, we suppose that the product market game in stage 2 is characterized by price-setting behavior by firms. From (1) and (2), we can write product demand facing firm i as:
(17)
Similarly, we can re-define profits of firm i as a function of prices:
As in the previous section of the paper, we proceed to solve the 2-stage game by backward induction. In stage 2, firms choose price to maximize profits. From (18), the first-order condition for profit-maximization gives:
and hence the best-reply function is positive for
: the Bertrand product market game is played in strategic substitutes. From (19), and its counterpart for firm j, each firm's price can be written as functions of the two wage levels pre-determined in stage 1.
Substituting the resulting prices into (17) yields:
which can be interpreted as the sub-game perfect labour demand function facing union i in the stage 1 wage-bargaining game and is the Bertrand equivalent to (6), derived in the foregoing analysis of Cournot competition in the product market. Substitution yields the expression for firm i's profits as:
which is the Bertrand equivalent to (8) for the case of Cournot competition.
As in Section 2, we now distinguish between 2 possible labour market regimes. In the benchmark case, wages are determined exogenously, while in the second case wages are the result of a strategic bargain between each firm and its labour union. In the standard model of differentiated duopoly, with marginal costs (wages) determined exogenously, the relation between Cournot and Bertrand profits is based on a comparison of (22) and (9). It is easily demonstrated that in this non-union case, the sign of (
) is equal to the sign of c . Hence, if firms produce imperfect substitutes, 0 > c , Cournot profits will exceed Bertrand profits in equilibrium. Accordingly, firms would prefer Cournot to Bertrand competition. We now derive the expression for sub-game perfect Bertrand equilibrium profits when wages are subject to bargaining.
(ii) Regime 2: endogenous wages
As in Section 2, we assume that there is an independent wage bargain between each firm and its labour union. Union preferences are given by (10) and the Nash maximand is represented by (11). Substituting (20), (21) and (10) in (11) and solving produces a firstorder condition for the Nash maximand that is satisfied when:
which defines the sub-game perfect best-reply function in wages, 
The slope of the best-reply wage function is again positive for
confirming that the labour market game is played in strategic complements, independent of the type of product market competition. Again, we note that the slope of the best-reply function in wages is increasing both in θ and in β .
In symmetric equilibrium, we derive sub-game perfect equilibrium profits as: 
The Cournot-Bertrand profit differential
Comparison of (16) and (26) 
where
space, along which the profit differential is zero. For the firms, this can be thought of as an iso-profit or 'indifference surface'. In order to examine the properties of this surface, we first consider cross-sections of the surface in 
where Â can be defined by: 
The sign of F is given by the sign of
Eq. (29) 
From the numerical solutions represented in Fig. 2 it follows that Surface[ Bertrand profits under duopoly, when products are imperfect substitutes, is reversed only when unions are both relatively powerful in the wage bargain and attach relatively high importance to wages in their objective functions. It follows that under symmetric Nash bargaining, for example, the reversal result does not obtain. Similarly, the standard profitranking will not be reversed if unions are simple rent-maximizers, attaching equal weight to wages and employment. A corollary of this is that if upstream agents are profitmaximising firms, then the standard result will obtain: rent-maximising by the union is formally equivalent to profit-maximising by an upstream firm.
The reversal result begs the question as to why the introduction of a stage 1 wage bargaining game into the standard analysis might change the standard ranking of Cournot and Bertrand profits. This issue is the focus of the next section of the paper.
Wages under Cournot and Bertrand competition
In the previous section of the paper, we demonstrated the key property of the model that the classic duopoly result regarding the superiority in the level of Cournot over Bertrand profits is overturned when wages are the result of bargaining, for sufficiently high values of β and θ , depending upon the value of . c In this Section of the paper, we examine why this reversal result obtains, and why the result depends upon the values of β and θ .
Comparison of (9) and (22) (35) where (35) is the solution to (11). Next, we derive the corresponding versions of (35) 
Hence, under Cournot competition the strategic effect on profits induced by a wage increase is strictly negative. The underlying intuition behind the negative strategic effect depends upon the adjustment of the Cournot firm to an exogenous change in marginal costs. In other words, a unit increase in i w expands firm j's output which in turn induces firm i to reduce its price and, hence, total revenue. On the other hand, the size effect captures the negative effect on profits associated with the total costs of producing i q units after a unit increase in the wage rate.
The Cournot version of (35) can be re-written as follows: 
Under Bertrand competition the strategic effect is strictly positive. This is due to the way in which firm i reacts to the wage increase: a unit increase in w i leads firm i to increase its price, after which, firm j follows by increasing its own. The latter is transmitted to an expansion of firm i's output. The increased output multiplied by the price mark-up raises total revenue. This is an important feature of the Bertrand competitor. Thus, the strategic effects are of opposite sign if we compare Cournot and Bertrand perceptions. Qiu (1997) also found an opposite sign in terms of R&D activity.
Finally, the size effect again captures the negative effect on profits associated with the total costs of producing i q units following a unit increase in the wage rate.
The corresponding Bertrand version of (35) can be re-written as follows: 
where B i η denotes the absolute value of the labour demand wage elasticity when competition in the product market is of the Bertrand-type. The LHS of (39) captures the positive effects to both parties from a wage increase and the RHS captures the negative effects. In other words, the wage is agreed at the level in which the proportional marginal benefit from a unit increase in the wage rate obtained by both parties equals the proportional marginal costs incurred by both parties: weighted by the corresponding party's bargaining strength. The most important and distinctive feature arising from the comparison of (37) and (39) is that firm i perceives a proportional marginal benefit from a wage increase when product market competition is Bertrand whereas it perceives a proportional marginal cost when competition is Cournot. This arises from the fact that the strategic effects are of opposite sign. The above derivation yields Proposition 3. (20) and (6) respectively yields the following comparison, (38) and (39).
Having established the ranking of SPNE wage rates under both types of competition we now turn to consider the relative sensitivities of Cournot and Bertrand profits to the SPNE bargained wage levels. 
The comparison of (40) and (41) establishes Proposition 4: It is straightforward to demonstrate that Proposition 4 confirms that the negative size effect dominates the positive strategic effect in determining the sign of the marginal profitability from a wage increase of the Bertrand competitor. Moreover, the proposition also demonstrates that Cournot profits are the more adversely affected by wage increases. This is due to the negative strategic effect coupled with the negative size effect induced by a wage increase.
In summary, the essential intuition for the relative profit reversal result is that under Cournot competition unions bargain a higher wage level than under Bertrand competition and that, furthermore, equilibrium Cournot profits are more sensitive to the level of the bargained wage than are Bertrand profits.
Conclusions and further remarks
In this paper, we have considered the standard model of differentiated duopoly in which it is well-known that Cournot equilibrium profits are higher than those associated with Bertrand equilibrium when firms produce imperfect substitutes. In the standard model, costs are assumed to be determined exogenously. We have examined the situation in which costs (wages) are determined through a process of decentralized bargaining between each firm and its upstream supplier (labour union). We have found that, under certain conditions, the relative magnitude of Cournot and Bertrand profits is reversed when we allow for bargaining over costs. Specifically, if unions are sufficiently powerful and care enough about wages in their utility function, then Bertrand profits exceed Cournot profits in sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium when goods are (imperfect) substitutes. The key intuition behind this result is that labour demand is less responsive to a change in wages under Cournot competition and this leads unions to bargain for higher wages than when competition in the product market is of the Bertrand type. Furthermore, Cournot profits fall more steeply than do Bertrand profits following any given increase in wages. If unions care sufficiently about wages and are strong enough to influence them substantially, then the fact that unions impact relatively more on wages and profits under Cournot competition overturns the standard result on the ranking of Cournot and Bertrand profits. We note that if the upstream agents are profit-maximising firms, the standard result obtains.
There are a number of obvious directions for further work. First, we have followed standard assumptions in our specification of the basic model. Our results show that the Cournot-Bertrand profit ranking can be reversed, but only when unions are both very powerful and highly geared towards wages in their objective function. It would be interesting to see to how sensitive the results are to alternative or to more general functional forms. Second, we have considered only the case of imperfect substitutes, 
